tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20662860.post4606462053723876680..comments2023-04-02T09:49:12.204-04:00Comments on Problems of Life: Tiberius on Reflection (and the Self)Matthew Pianaltohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20662860.post-41673003982040365572009-09-12T13:09:12.099-04:002009-09-12T13:09:12.099-04:00Tiberius' distinction or division between a &q...Tiberius' distinction or division between a "reflective" and "non-reflective" self may be a fair reflection of the pervasiveness of "dual-process" theories in contemporary empirical psychology. As Timothy D. Wilson (a psychologist whose work, along with that of Daniel Wegner, is frequently invoked as empirical confirmation of Nietzsche's psychological profundity and prescience) puts it:<br><br><i>Since</i> [Freud]<i>, numerous dual process theories have been proposed that posit the existence of separate information processing systems, with one of them being much more available to consciousness than the other</i>[...] <i>These theories suggest that Freud may have been too conservative in his characterization of the unconscious. The architecture of the mind is such that a great deal of mental processing occurs outside of conscious awareness, not because thoughts and feelings are threatening to people, but because that is how the mind has evolved to work</i> [...T]<i>he key distinction is that one system is less available to introspection, and it is up to the other to make conscious inferences about oneself that may or may not be accurate.</i> <br><br>And here, of course, is the especially Nietzschean part I relish:<br><br><i> These theories typically adopt a more pessimistic outlook on self-knowledge than psychoanalysis, because they view a lack of access to mental processes as part of the architecture of the mind that can’t be breached, rather than the results of motivational forces that can be overcome (albeit with difficulty).</i><br><br>Source:<br>http://www.psychologicalscience.org/journals/pps/4_4_pdfs/wilson.pdfRobhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10546265581296919974noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20662860.post-8243911451105525952009-09-14T15:19:48.985-04:002009-09-14T15:19:48.985-04:00Rob: I agree it's a fair reflection of several...Rob: I agree it's a fair reflection of several different ways of thinking of the self as divided. It was maybe just the wording that set me off: that there are multiple "selves" in the self doesn't, in a certain way, make sense. Better to talk about parts of the self, perhaps. But then I guess the question is whether--or how--the unconscious bits <i>are</i> to be identified as <i>part</i> of the self, rather than something alien...Matthew Pianaltohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20662860.post-72378469035787583332009-09-14T16:40:01.023-04:002009-09-14T16:40:01.023-04:00Perhaps a benefit of the otherwise troublesome dis...Perhaps a benefit of the otherwise troublesome distinction between two selves is that it opens the possibility that the center of balance, as it were, of our identity can shift back and forth between them?Robhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10546265581296919974noreply@blogger.com