Here's a puzzle I've been thinking about (with qualifiers, especially about the rife usage of the term reasonable below):
1. Most of us are, more or less, reasonable.
2. Most of us have some convictions about controversial issues (and reasonable people have conflicting convictions; hence, the controversy).
3. When our beliefs conflict with the beliefs of other (equally) reasonable people we should weaken our confidence in our own belief (tantamount to withdrawing our conviction, possibly adopting an agnostic stance on the issue).
4. Thus, it would seem that reasonable people should not have convictions (about controversial issues).
5. But reasonable people do have such convictions.
6. Thus, reasonable people are not reasonable!
Qualifiers:
A. By reasonable, I mean susceptible to evidence, disinclined to take radical skepticism seriously (or a pragmatic reason for disbelief), not inclined to the preposterous view that we are infallible (or even less fallible than our peers), etc.
B. I limit "controversial issues" to disagreements between reasonable persons. So, whether the Holocaust occurred is not a controversial issue.
Thoughts:
- Maybe 1 is false? Let's hope not! (If we aren't, to some degree, reasonable, how will we get out of this mess?)
- I'm inclined to think there is something wrong with 3, even though it looks...reasonable. But denying 3 seems tricky. One possibility is that not all reasonable people are "epistemic peers"--that is, our background beliefs might be sufficiently different to give us each independent justification for holding the particular convictions we have. Nevertheless, if I have to assume that your background beliefs are just as prima facie reasonable as mine, then when confronted with a genuine, persisting controversy, I seem to have some reason to weaken my belief.
The puzzle, in part, has to do with a way I'm proposing we understand the notion of a conviction: we have convictions precisely about those things that are controversial in the sense above. If an issue is not controversial, then it does not, on my account, count as a "matter of conviction." (It's not my conviction that the Holocaust occurred, or that slavery is wrong...but I do, of course, believe these things and am completely convinced of them.) (NB: Convictions in my sense are not "blind": the person of conviction has reasons for her beliefs.)
So the puzzle is that it looks like it is never reasonable to have convictions on the very issues on which it is possible to believe with conviction (i.e. controversial issues). So, either we're not being reasonable in having convictions or, roughly, 3 above must go. (Or maybe my working account of conviction is the trouble-maker here?) To be continued...
You've basically described the epistemic problem of disagreement, though it's usually cashed out in term of confidence or credence rather than conviction. (Though I suppose conviction tracks one of those two) Your three is where most of the interesting discussion takes place. Here are some moves people have made with regards to a disagreement over P.
ReplyDeleteGrant that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should withhold belief in P. Claim this doesn't lead to skepticism because peers aren't really that common.
Grant that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should withhold belief in P, and grant that we should be skeptics about controversial issues.
Grant that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should adjust your credences wrt P in the direction of your peer. (This could include adjusting your credence up)
Deny that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should always withhold belief in P because there are disagreements with multiple rational outcomes.
Deny that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should always withhold belief in P because you have special insight in some cases.
Deny that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should always withhold belief in P because you have access to personal information that can break the symmetry.
Deny that when you disagree with an epistemic peer you should withhold belief in P in cases where you have the true position. (maddog)
This is of course a quick gloss. I can send you a bibliography on the subject if you're interested. There is a separate literature on disagreement in the moral domain that is largely independent of what goes on in epistemology. I think the difference comes down to one of practical vs theoretical rationality. The later is what goes on in epistemology and it only admits of one maximally rational outcome.
Matthew you said
ReplyDelete"I limit "controversial issues" to disagreements between reasonable persons. So, whether the Holocaust occurred is not a controversial issue."
Your implication here is that the denial of overwhelming proof for a truth negates a person as being reasonable in discussing that truth. I agree with this but must add that not all truth is so easily seen or proven in the same way as the Holocaust. Proof of truth does not only come by way of abstract methods such as spoken or written words and pictures but also by way of concrete reality. I would say that concrete reality is in fact the ultimate proof. But just as abstract truth can be denied, misunderstood, or just plain not seen, so can concrete truth.
" When our beliefs conflict with the beliefs of other (equally) reasonable people we should weaken our confidence in our own
belief (tantamount to withdrawing our conviction, possibly adopting an agnostic stance on the issue)."
I can understand this position but there is something in me that pulls back and says don't budge, I guess that is what conviction is. This is not to say that someone should not budge but it should not be the one that is on truth's side whomever that might be.
There are many levels of belief and some go deeper then others. How can one weaken his confidence in the present moment when he is ready and willing to take his belief to the grave?
Jack: right. Something does say "don't budge."
ReplyDeleteMatt: I suppose I'm more interested in "practical" rationality than theoretical (it's been too long since Funk's seminar for me to recall what the precise distinction is though--sorry). This is why I wanted to formulate the puzzle in terms of reasonableness rather than rationality. (Rawls and Scanlon take reasonableness to be meatier than rationality. For them, it's compatible with being rational not to be concerned with others ends (etc.) (since a rational egoist isn't), but a reasonable person is (so, isn't an egoist). Maybe that all falls under the purview of practical rationality? At any rate, I think that's where I'm headed, insofar as our convictions--moral ones at least--have a lot of practical significance!)
Thanks for laying out the terrain!
Given your interest on the moral side, Alexandra Plakias has a paper with John Doris dealing with disagreement in the moral domain. Alex is pretty cool, so if you email her I'm sure she'd send you a copy of the paper and she'd be better at pointing you to the relevant literature.
ReplyDeleteI'll send along the E stuff too.
Thanks, Matt. I'll check out that paper. (I should be looking at those Sinnott-Armstrong Moral Psychology books anyhow...)
ReplyDeleteMatthew,
ReplyDeleteI have for awhile been having this reoccurring thought and it has a relation to your topic on conviction even if it is only imaginary and by the way my wife had a problem in understanding the concept.
I call it (the truth telling gun.)and it is infallible and it works in the following way.
Two men have contradicting convictions and the only way that their disagreement can be absolutely resolved is with the use of the truth telling gun.
The way this gun works is that it true -fully confirms or denies the truth or falsity of ones belief.
This is not a game to be played by those whose convictions are weak.
One holds the gun to his head, states his belief and then pulls the trigger.If his belief is true then no problem and if it is not true, then no problem for the second man and the only difference is that the second man is still breathing air.
The real clincher question is how many are there who are so confident in their conviction who would go first in order to save the life of the other?
The question is how many beliefs do we hold where we would go first in order that the other might live to see another day.
Jack:
ReplyDeleteI like the idea of the "truth-telling gun." (I can see this in an alternate reality sort of film, with Christopher Walken--think The Deer Hunter--somehow involved!)
Let's ignore how we know it really is a truth-telling gun. What's it testing? Our tolerance, or our compassion? I would guess that Scott Roeder would happily have let George Tiller go first. If you think of the Spanish Inquisition, the motive for burning heretics was that it was better to force a conversion and then kill them before they could recant than to let the heretic go on living a damned life. Of course, it's not clear one can force a real conversion. Now maybe, if they were really concerned for the salvation of heretics, then they would not want the alleged heretics to use the gun, since that would send them straight to hell.
On the other hand, if you think the truth is worth dying for, then we could clear up a lot of questions with a truth-telling gun. Think of it: you're on your deathbed, ready to go, so as your final contribution to society, you ask them to bring on the gun...
I'm not sure, however, it would make sense to say that using the gun is a case of risking one's life for the sake of one's own convictions: rather, it's risking one's life for the sake of the truth, whatever it is.
Matthew,
ReplyDeleteI seriously wonder if mankind at this late stage in his psychological development could even tolerate the existence of let us say, a truth telling machine? In all honesty I think eventually a global level resentment would slowly begin to emerge which in turn would have to lead to an ever growing active resistance or to put it in even starker terms, the machine would have to be destroyed.
Matthew said:
ReplyDelete"I'm not sure, however, it would make sense to say that using the gun is a case of risking one's life for the sake of one's own convictions: rather, it's risking one's life for the sake of the truth, whatever it is."
I like that.
Matthew,
ReplyDeleteI believe that common sense and intuition have their own special role or part to play when it comes to holding a conviction that is not yet supported by intellectual or scientific proof . Lets take the following examples from the past and the present such as: the earth is round, cigarettes cause cancer and man has freewill.
As we know the first two claims have been proven to be true and the last one is to this day still being debated. I happen to believe that all three are true even if freewill doesn't have the same level of convincing power as the first two. However I think that all three statements are reasonable even before there was any type of hard proof. I think that a certain type of common sense intuition is what is most able to give one the necessary support to hold faith in an unproven belief but of coarse it is the concrete reality itself which offers the highest level of proof that is possible.
Jack:
ReplyDeleteI disagree that it's intuitive that the earth is round. It might just be really long in any direction we might choose to run. (And if you come back to where you started, and are sure you didn't make a turn, then you have evidence.)
I'm more sympathetic to what you say about free will.