Patience vs. Anger, Resentment, and Revenge

I wrote this yesterday. Does it seem like an utter crock of shit a bit too Pollyanna-ish?

...It might be said, however, that some actions are unforgivable, that some wrongs cannot be tolerated or borne patiently. In such cases, resentment and revenge might seem more appropriate: who wants to hear about giving Nazis or other war criminals a second chance? Of forgiving them for their horrible crimes against humanity? These objections are powerful, and I don’t want to undertake a detailed response to them here...Instead, I want to note...a significant difference in the orientation of patient tolerance and endurance in contrast with anger, resentment, and revenge. As I have already discussed, the patient person is also a mindful, attentive person; patience is not oblivious to harms that occur and have occurred, and the patient person need not fail to judge wrongs as wrongs. But patience is also forward-thinking, attuned not only to the past and the present but also to the future. Persistent anger and resentment, by contrast, get stuck in the past. Although the person who seeks revenge certainly makes plans for the future, his or her plans are completely constrained by the harms of the past. The way in which past harms dominate the life and thought of the vengeful and resentful person thereby constrains this person’s vision and attention—the present and future are no longer a source of novel opportunities and new ideas and relationships, but only the continuation of a bitter, narrowly defined past. This raises a question about whether the person dominated by anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge is capable of moral, intellectual, or, if you wish, spiritual growth. Patience, as well as mercy and forgiveness, might by contrast be seen as activities that enable us to get on with our lives, to be receptive to a future that is richer in its opportunities and possibilities than the future of someone who lives only for the sake of revenge, or of someone embittered against life as a result of past harms and losses. Of course, this doesn’t mean that in patience we will simply forget the past. Rather, patience makes it possible to continue to live an open, searching—one might even say, hopeful—life, in spite of the past harms and adversities that often leave permanent and deep marks upon us.

Aristotle on Courage and Revenge

Here's something I ran (back) across while looking over Aristotle's chapters on courage in Book III of Nicomachean Ethics:

Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be brave, because brave men also are passionate; for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homer's 'put strength into his passion' and 'aroused their spirit and passion and 'hard he breathed panting' and 'his blood boiled'. For all such expressions seem to indicate the stirring and onset of passion. Now brave men act for honour's sake, but passion aids them; while wild beasts act under the influence of pain; for they attack because they have been wounded or because they are afraid, since if they are in a forest they do not come near one. Thus they are not brave because, driven by pain and passion, they rush on danger without foreseeing any of the perils, since at that rate even asses would be brave when they are hungry; for blows will not drive them from their food; and lust also makes adulterers do many daring things. (Those creatures are not brave, then, which are driven on to danger by pain or passion.) The 'courage' that is due to passion seems to be the most natural, and to be courage if choice and motive be added.

Men, then, as well as beasts, suffer pain when they are angry, and are pleased when they exact their revenge; those who fight for these reasons, however, are pugnacious but not brave; for they do not act for honour's sake nor as the rule directs, but from strength of feeling; they have, however, something akin to courage. (NE, III, Ch. 8)

The mention of revenge is what first caught my eye, then I had to go back and re-read the first paragraph. (This discussion is of one of five "semblances" of courage Aristotle discusses.) Then I notice the line that such passionate action seems "to be courage if choice and motive is added." This would make it seem that a more pre-meditated form of "revenge"--what we might properly think of revenge, rather than an unreflective striking back--is, or at least seems, courageous.

This paper by Krisanna Scheiter is very helpful in clarifying what Aristotle means by revenge and what its function is (and that Aristotle would have thought that revenge can take immoral forms). However, she argues that the primary function of revenge (and suggests that this can be seen in Aristotle) is to "right a wrong and to ensure that we are not treated unjustly in the future" (2). I'm not sure how well this fits with Aristotle's claim above that the brave person acts "for honour's sake," since this would suggest that the brave person who engages in an act of revenge does it to restore (protect?) "honour."

Scheiter marks a clear distinction (for Aristotle) between punishment (done for the sake of the wrongdoer, to improve him) and revenge (done for the sake of the wronged, to ensure that they will not be wronged by this person again). So perhaps the idea is that revenge sends the message that one isn't to be f*cked with--and perhaps one's honor is bound up with that 'not-to-be-f*cked-with-ness'. (This would seem to suggest that revenge would only be appropriate when the wrongdoer hadn't already figured that out and/or the person remains a threat. Otherwise, there's no honor, or presumably bravery, in exacting it.)

One interesting point she makes toward the end of the paper is that, "on Aristotle's account, revenge does not have to be severe or violent in order to be effective." That makes me wonder whether there could be a form of "revenge" which, at the same time, doesn't violate Socrates' claim (in Crito) that it's wrong to wrong another, even if we have been wronged (and maybe even if it is violent). It seems this way because it seems like "revenge" here is something like preemptive self-defense. But then it doesn't exactly seem like what we might normally call revenge.

Apply to your favorite cases. Discuss.

Revenge

Part of me wants to believe in revenge, just enough to vindicate the natural rage a parent feels even at the thought of harm coming to their children. But read this piece on the potential release of Michael Woodmansee and the statements by the father of his victim that if Woodmansee is released the father will seek out and kill him. And then definitely read the comments on the article.

I feel the gut-level urge to violent retribution as much as any parent. But I also can't see revenge as having any point here. And it doesn't strike me as helpful to dress it up as "justice." (Or as a matter of preventing the "monster" from striking again.)

The comments well-illustrate Socrates' remark in the Crito that the disagreement between those who believe that wrongs should be repaid in kind and those who reject this (as does Socrates) is fundamental and that both parties can do little more than despise each other.